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I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout the development of employment discrimination
law, the United States Supreme Court has wrestled with the task of
producing a suitable analytical framework, under which plaintiffs
can attempt to prove their cases of disparate treatment by their
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employers. An element of this task has been determining which
types of evidence of discriminatory intent have probative value, and
what effect that evidence should have on plaintiffs' and defendants'
cases. In June 2000, the Supreme Court decided Reeves v. Sander-
son Plumbing Products,' a case involving a disparate treatment
claim brought by an employee alleging age discrimination by his
employer in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA).
2
Reeves represents the most recent step taken by the Supreme
Court in its effort to clarify what a plaintiff must prove, using cir-
cumstantial evidence, in order to prevail on a claim of intentional
employment discrimination. 3 In doing so, the Reeves Court also
touched upon how evidence of remarks made in the workplace can
assist plaintiffs in satisfying their burden of persuasion. 4 Thus, the
Reeves opinion may be viewed as having two major impacts on em-
ployment discrimination law: (1) it clarified the evidentiary burden
borne by a plaintiff in a disparate treatment case; and (2) it modi-
fied the Stray Remarks Doctrine5 as it applies to such disparate
treatment cases.
6
This Note evaluates the current status of the Stray Remarks
Doctrine in light of the Court's opinion in Reeves.7 It additionally
seeks to determine which types of discriminatory workplace re-
marks, if any, should have probative value, both in cases where the
plaintiff produces direct evidence of discrimination, and also in
cases where the plaintiff must prove his or her case by circumstan-
tial evidence.
To complete this evaluation, this Note begins by providing
an overview of plaintiffs' claims under the ADEA and under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII).8 Parts II and III of
this Note describe the elements of a disparate treatment claim and
trace the Court's development of an analytical framework with
1. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 138 (2000).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
3. 530 U.S. at 138.
4. Id. at 150-54.
5. The Stray Remarks Doctrine was first articulated by Justice O'Connor in her concurring
opinion in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. 490 U.S. 228, 277-78 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
In general, under the Stray Remarks Doctrine, certain statements made by nondecisionmakers,
or statements unrelated to a decisionmaking process, are not direct evidence of an employer's
discriminatory motive. Id. The doctrine will be discussed at length later in this Note. See infra
Parts V, VI.
6. 530 U.S. at 150-54.
7. Id.
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-16 (1994).
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which plaintiffs may prove these claims. In Part IV, this Note fo-
cuses on the Court's decision in Reeves, particularly noting the
clarifications that the Court made regarding the respective burdens
placed on both plaintiffs and defendants in disparate treatment
suits.9 This Note continues on in Part V to discuss the development
of the Stray Remarks Doctrine and its application by lower federal
courts in employment discrimination cases. Finally this Note ex-
plores the status of the Stray Remarks Doctrine in light of the
Court's opinion in Reeves 10 and questions what part, if any, of this
doctrine should still be considered good law.
II. MAKING A CASE UNDER TITLE VII AND THE ADEA
A. An Overview of Title VII and the ADEA
Employment discrimination suits occupy an expanding por-
tion of federal court dockets. Typically brought under Title VII, 11
the majority of these cases allege discrimination based on race,
color, sex, religion, or national origin. 12 Moreover, a growing num-
ber of employment discrimination suits today also allege violations
of the ADEA.13
Title VII makes it unlawful for employers, 14 labor organiza-
tions, and employment agencies to discriminate against employees 15
and applicants on the basis of their race, color, sex, religion, and
9. 530 U.S. at 134-55.
10. Id. at 154-55.
11. §§ 2000e to 2000e-16.
It shall be unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1) to fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin....
Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
12. ROBERT BELTON & DIANE AVERY, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS ON EQUALITY IN THE WORKPLACE 30, 69 (6th ed. 1999).
13. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), charged with enforcement of
Title VII and the ADEA, reported in 1982 that age discrimination administrative complaints
constitute the fastest growing group of claims with which it deals. See Vihstadt, Congressional
Update, 5 BIFOCAL 8 (1984).
14. "The term 'employer' means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who
has fifteen or more employees for each working day .... 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994) (emphasis
added).
15. Title VII defines "employees" in a circular way: an "employee" is "an individual em-
ployed by an employer." Id. § 2000e(f). The Supreme Court stated that courts should presume
that Congress, referring to employees, meant "the conventional master-servant relationship as
understood by common-law agency doctrine." Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318,
322-23 (1992) (quoting Cmty. for Creating Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739-40 (1989)).
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national origin. 16 Enacted in 1964, and amended most recently in
1991, Title VII was designed by Congress to achieve equality of em-
ployment opportunities and to eliminate discriminatory impedi-
ments to that equality. 17 In passing Title VII, Congress did not in-
tend, however, to "command that any person be hired simply be-
cause he was formerly the subject of discrimination, or because he
is a member of a minority group."
8
Similarly, the ADEA, enacted in 1967, and substantially
amended in 1974 and 1978,19 prohibits employers, 20 labor unions,
and employment agencies from participating in employment dis-
crimination on the basis of age. 21 The goal of the ADEA, as set forth
in its Statement of Findings and Purpose, is "to promote employ-
ment of older persons based on their ability rather than age; to pro-
hibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; and to help em-
ployers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the
impact of age on employment. 22 Under the ADEA, it is unlawful for
an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual
or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, be-
cause of such individual's age."23 In order to be protected under the
16. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
17. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971); see also Patrick M. Edwards,
Casenote, Proof of Employer Pretext Does Not Entitle Employee to a Decision Without Further
Proof of Discrimination, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 71 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 693 (1994).
18. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973) (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S.
at 430-31).
19. While Congress was developing the Civil Rights Act of 1964, proposals were made to in-
clude age in the list of prohibited criteria set forth in the Title VII provision. See 110 CONG. REC.
2,596-99 (1964). Although Congress eventually decided not to include age as a protected class
under Title VII, it did direct the Secretary of Labor to conduct a study on the nature and extent
of age discrimination in the workplace. The Secretary conducted the study, and after its comple-
tion, recommended that legislation be passed to prevent such age-based discrimination. A bill
was submitted in 1967, and the ADEA was passed that same year. See 110 CONG. REC. 9,911-13,
13,490-92 (1964) (discussing proposed amendments); Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-
352, § 715, 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. (78 Stat.) 287, 316 (superseded by the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 10, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. (86 Stat. 11, 132); see
also The Older American Worker-Age Discrimination in Employment, Report of the Secretary of
Labor to the Congress under Section 715 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (1965).
20. In order to constitute an "employer" covered under the ADEA, the employer must have
at least twenty employees. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994) (defining employer).
21. For an excellent overview of the intricacies of the ADEA, see generally Howard Eglit,
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act's Forgotten Affirmative Defense: The Reasonable
Factors Other than Age Exception, 66 B.U. L. REV. 155 (1986).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1994).
23. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1994).
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ADEA, the employee 24 must be over the age of forty.25 To be sure, an
employer does not automatically violate the ADEA if he terminates
or demotes an employee for insufficient cause, merely because the
employee is older than forty years of age. 26 Indeed, as the Seventh
Circuit noted, "The statute is not a guarantee of tenure for the older
worker."27 That said, it is reasonable to question which conduct and
decisions do trigger liability for the employer under the ADEA and
Title VII.
B. Choosing a Claim: Disparate Impact or Disparate Treatment
If protected employees believe that they have been discrimi-
nated against by their employers on the basis of their race, color,
sex, religion, or national origin, the employees have two types of
allegations that they may bring against the employers under Title
VII: a disparate impact claim or a disparate treatment claim. 28 A
disparate treatment claim alleges that an employer intentionally
discriminated against the plaintiff, whereas a disparate impact
claim alleges that although the employer did not intentionally dis-
criminate, its employment practices result in a disparate impact on
the class to which the plaintiff belongs. Most cases alleging viola-
tions of the ADEA, are brought under the disparate treatment the-
ory of discrimination. 29 Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in
Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, circuit courts have split over whether a
plaintiff who feels he has been the target of age discrimination may
also bring a disparate impact claim under the ADEA. 30
24. In Robinson u. Shell Oil Co., the Supreme Court held that the term "employee" covers a
former employee who brings a claim of discrimination against his former employer. 519 U.S. 337,
346 (1997).
25. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (1994).
26. See Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 401-02 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that evidence of
employer's discriminatory intent offered by plaintiff was sufficient to defeat employer's motion
for summary judgment).
27. Id. at 401.
28. See H. Lane Dennard, Jr. and Kendall L. Kelly, Price Waterhouse: Alive and Well Under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 51 MERCER L. REV. 721, 735-43 (2000) (discussing
judicial application of the ADEA).
29. The Supreme Court in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, stated that "[t]he disparate treat-
ment theory is of course available under the ADEA, as the language of that statute makes clear."
507 U.S. 604, 609 (1993).
30. Id. at 618 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[Niothing in the Court's opinion should be read as
incorporating in the ADEA context the so-called 'disparate impact' theory of Title VII . . ").
Several circuits have rejected the applicability of the disparate impact theory in ADEA cases.
See, e.g., Lyon v. Ohio Educ. Ass'n and Profl Staff Union, 53 F.3d 135, 138-39 (6th Cir. 1995);
EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073, 1080 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1142
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1. Disparate Impact Claims: Violations Absent Discriminatory
Motive
A plaintiff who chooses to bring a disparate impact claim
must demonstrate that his or her employer's particular employment
policies produce a statistically significant disparate impact on a
protected class 31 to which the plaintiff belongs. 32 Such a dispropor-
tionate adverse impact may constitute a violation of Title VII, if the
factfinder concludes that the employment decision was not other-
wise justifiable, regardless of whether the employer intended to dis-
criminate. 33 The idea behind the disparate impact doctrine is that
employment practices that systematically disadvantage members of
a certain group should not be acceptable unless the employer can
justify the practices by a showing of "business necessity."34
2. Disparate Treatment Claims: Proving Discriminatory Intent
The more common allegation brought by plaintiffs in ADEA
and Title VII cases against their employers is the disparate treat-
ment claim.35 Under such a claim, a plaintiff must establish that
the employer intentionally discriminated against him or her be-
cause he or she is a member of the protected class (i.e., over forty
years of age). 36 The primary distinction between a disparate treat-
ment claim and a disparate impact claim is that in order to estab-
(1995). Other appellate courts have continued to apply the disparate impact theory in ADEA
cases even after Hazen Paper. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Des Moines, 99 F.3d 1466, 1470 (8th Cir.
1996); Mangold v. Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 67 F.3d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 1995).
31. A protected class is a group of individuals for whom a statute expressly provides protec-
tion. See BELTON & AVERY, supra note 12, at 48.
32. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (holding that neutral employ-
ment policies with adverse impacts could run afoul of Title VII, regardless of whether plaintiff is
able to establish discriminatory intent on the part of the employer, so long as plaintiff can estab-
lish, usually through statistical evidence, a disparate impact upon the protected group to which
plaintiff belongs). For a lengthy discussion of disparate impact cases, see Tracy E. Higgins &
Laura A. Rosenbury, Discrimination and Inequality Emerging Issues Agency, Equality, and
Antidiscrimination Law, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1194, 1205-08 (2000) (emphasizing the decline of
the disparate impact doctrine in federal employment discrimination law).
33. For a more detailed discussion of the disparate impact theory, under which a plaintiff
may bring an employment discrimination claim, see Joseph J. Ward, A Call for Price Waterhouse
II: The Legacy of Justice O'Connor's Direct Evidence Requirement for Mixed-Motive Employment
Discrimination Claims, 61 ALB. L. REV. 627, 630-32 (1997).
34. For a discussion of what satisfies a showing of "business necessity," see Contreras v.
City of L.A., 656 F.2d 1267, 1275-84 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1021 (1982).
35. See Higgins & Rosenbury, supra note 32, at 1205.
36. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 141 (2000). "When a
plaintiff alleges disparate treatment, 'liability depends on whether the protected trait (under the
ADEA, age) actually motivated the employer's decision.' " Id. (quoting Hazen Paper Co. v. Big-
gins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993).
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lish a disparate treatment claim, the plaintiff must demonstrate
that a discriminatory intent or animus37 motivated the employer to
make the disputed employment decision. 38 That is, in a disparate
treatment claim, the plaintiffs age, race, sex, etc. must have "actu-
ally played a role in the employer's decisionmaking process and had
a determinative influence on the outcome." 39 The discriminatory
reason need not be the sole reason for the decision. 40 The protected
trait, however, must have been a motivating factor4' for the deci-
sion; it must have actually played a role in the decisionmaking
process and had a determinative influence on the outcome in order
for the adverse decision to constitute an act of disparate treat-
ment.
42
C. Establishing a Discriminatory Treatment Claim
The task of proving an employer's discriminatory animus,
which is required in disparate treatment claims, often proves to be
quite difficult for plaintiffs. They may choose to establish their
cases of discriminatory treatment in one of two ways: either
through the presentation of direct evidence of discriminatory mo-
tive, or, more commonly, by weaving together pieces of indirect, or
circumstantial, evidence of discrimination by their employers. 4
3
37. The term "animus" refers to "intention; disposition; design; will." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 87 (6th ed. 1990). Thus, an employer's discriminatory animus is the discriminatory
intention behind the employer's actions.
38. In disparate treatment cases, "[plroof of discriminatory motive is critical .... Proof of
discriminatory motive . . . is not required under a disparate impact theory." See BELTON &
AVERY, supra note 12, at 63 (citing Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977)).
39. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 141.
40. See id.
41. When this Note characterizes the discriminatory reason as a motivating factor in an
employment decision, it follows Justice Brennan's statement: "In saying that [for example, age]
played a motivating part in a employment decision," this means that if the employer were asked
what its reasons were at the moment of the decision, and if the employer answered truthfully,
then one of the reasons given for the decision would be that the employee or applicant was too
old. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989).
42. See Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F.3d 989, 994 (5th Cir. 1996).
43. The type of evidence the plaintiff possesses to prove his or her case dictates the ap-
proach that a court must take in analyzing the disparate treatment claim. If a plaintiff has direct
evidence of an employer's discriminatory motive, then the case is analyzed under an analytical
framework formulated by the Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse. The Court in Price Water-
house held that in direct evidence cases (later known also as "Price Waterhouse cases"), by pre-
senting direct evidence of discriminatory animus, a plaintiff may shift the burden of persuasion
to the defendant. 490 U.S. at 271. This shift requires the defendant to convince the factfinder
that it would have reached the same employment decision but for the presence of discriminatory
motivation. Id. This Price Waterhouse framework is distinct from the McDonnell Douglas frame-
work discussed in detail later in this Note. See infra Part III.
226
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1. Using Direct Evidence
In a plaintiffs ideal situation, she will have direct evidence
that her employer fired her, demoted her, or refused to hire her be-
cause of her age, race, sex, etc. 44 The question of what constitutes
direct evidence in an employment discrimination case has prompted
much debate among courts 45 and legal scholars, 46 and the U.S. Su-
preme Court has handed down no clear definition of direct evi-
dence. 4 Based upon case law and commentary, however, one may
conclude that certain statements made by an employer to an em-
ployee would constitute direct evidence of discriminatory motive. 48
For example, if during an interview in which plaintiff A sought a
position from employer X the employer told the plaintiff, "I would
hire you, but I am not going to because you are Hispanic," this
statement would likely constitute direct evidence of the employer's
motivation for the decision. Employer X has made clear to the
plaintiff, through his statement, that his intent is to refuse to hire
plaintiff A because of her race. If, in a case against employer X,
plaintiff A presented evidence of the employer's statement, and the
factfinder found the direct evidence to be reliable, then the evidence
44. Plaintiffs with direct evidence have a greater chance of proving their cases than those
who must rely on circumstantial or indirect evidence. See BELTON & AVERY, supra note 12, at 67.
45. See, e.g., Wright v. Southland Corp., 187 F.3d 1287, 1288, 1293 (11th Cir. 1999) (indicat-
ing that "the proper legal analysis in employment discrimination cases ...has been further
complicated by the indiscriminate use of the term 'direct evidence,'" which has resulted in 'sub-
stantial confusion" in the courts and has "baffled courts and commentators for some time"). The
Eleventh Circuit ultimately defined "direct evidence" as "evidence from which a reasonable trier
of fact could find, more probably than not, a causal link between an adverse employment action
and a protected personal characteristic." Id. The First Circuit also discussed the many attempts
by jurists to define precisely "direct evidence." See Fernandes v. Costa Bros. Masonry, Inc., 199
F.3d 572, 582-84 (1st Cir. 1999). In its analysis, the Fernandes court outlined three approaches
taken by different courts: first, the "classic" position (which holds that direct evidence signifies
"evidence which, if believed, suffices to prove the fact of discriminatory animus without infer-
ence, presumption, or resort to other evidence"); second, the "animus plus" position (which de-
fines "direct evidence" as "evidence .. .that (1) reflect[s] directly the alleged discriminatory ani-
mus and (2) bearts] squarely on the contested employment decision"); and third, the "animus"
position (which concludes that 'as long as the evidence ... is tied to the alleged discriminatory
animus, it need not bear squarely on the challenged employment decision"). Id. at 582.
46. See, e.g., Robert Belton, Mixed-Motive Cases in Employment Discrimination Law Revis-
ited: A Brief Updated View of the Swamp, 51 MERCER L. REV. 651, 662-63 (2000). In a section
entitled, "The Meaning of'Direct Evidence,'" Professor Belton outlines the competing definitions
of direct evidence that the courts have developed, concluding that the term's meaning is "murky."
Id.
47. For a thorough discussion of the conflicting theories of what constitutes direct evidence
in employment discrimination cases, see id. and see also Michael J. Zimmer, Chaos or Coherence:
Individual Disparate Treatment Discrimination and the ADEA, 51 MERCER L. REV. 693, 694-713
(2000).
48. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 228; Fernandes, 199 F.3d at 583-84.
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would prove the fact of discrimination without a need for inference
or conjecture on the part of the factfinder.49 Just as one can con-
clude that certain remarks made by employers would undoubtedly
constitute direct evidence, by relying on Supreme Court and lower
federal court decisions, one can also be sure that other kinds of dis-
criminatory workplace remarks certainly cannot be characterized
as direct evidence. 50 The probative value of such indirect "stray re-
marks" will be discussed at length later in this Note.51
While ideal for plaintiffs attempting to prove their cases,
admissions of discrimination by employers are rare.5 2 Indeed, em-
ployers are hesitant about revealing any unlawful and discrimina-
tory motivations to those they are discriminating against.5 3 As Pro-
fessor Ann McGinley has surmised, this fact may stem from in-
creased sophistication among modern employers that includes an
awareness of the legal ramifications of discriminatory actions. 54 Al-
ternatively, it may be derived simply from a facet of human nature
that seeks to hide discriminatory feelings because voicing such
views in considered socially unacceptable. 55
Regardless of why employers are not to reveal their dis-
criminatory intent, very few cases exist in which a plaintiff has
been able to establish such clear and uncontested evidence of dis-
criminatory motive.5 6 The dilemma thus arises as to how a plaintiff
may prove the element of discriminatory intent that is necessary to
prevail in an employment discrimination suit if the employer has
not overtly stated his or her discriminatory motive. The answer is
49. See BELTON & AVERY, supra note 12, at 67.
50. See infra Parts V-VI.
51. See id.
52. "Few employers who engage in illegal discrimination, however, express their discrimi-
natory tendencies in such a direct fashion." EEOC v. Pape Lift Co., 115 F.3d 676, 684 (9th Cir.
1997).
53. The Seventh Circuit explained that "[dlefendants of even minimal sophistication will
neither admit discriminatory animus nor leave a paper trail demonstrating it .... " Riordan v.
Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 697 (7th Cir. 1987).
54. Professor Ann C. McGinley has made the argument that after the passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, discrimination became more subtle and overt racism became the exception,
not the rule. See Ann C. McGinley, iViva La Evolucion!: Recognizing Unconscious Motive in Title
VII, 9 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POLY 415, 448-49 (2000). Professor McGinley attributes this change
in human behavior to employer's increased sophistication and knowledge about what types of
behavior, if demonstrated in court, will trigger a plaintiff victory in an employment discrimina-
tion suit. See id.
55. See Anne Lawton, The Meritocracy Myth and the Illusion of Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity, 85 MINN. L. REV. 587, 637 (2000) (asserting that "overtly racist and sexist comments are
much less common in today's workplace").
56. "Plaintiffs in the vast majority of employment discrimination cases must rely on circum-
stantial evidence.. . ." BELTON & AVERY, supra note 12, at 67.
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that the plaintiff must combine pieces of indirect, or circumstantial,
evidence to design a "convincing mosaic of discrimination against
the plaintiff."5 7 Chief Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit, in
Troupe v. May Department Stores,58 identified three types of cir-
cumstantial evidence: first, the most common type, "behavior to-
ward or comments directed at employees in the protected group";
second, statistical data that an employer has systematically treated
a protected class in an adverse way; and third, pretext evidence5 9
that an employer's explanation for an employment decision is "un-
worthy of belief, a mere pretext for discrimination."
60
2. Using Indirect or Circumstantial Evidence
The Supreme Court identified the proper evidentiary stan-
dards for proving disparate treatment claims using circumstantial
evidence in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green-a decision that has
become the cornerstone of common law decisions on disparate
treatment in employment situations.
6'
III. THE MCDONNELL DOUGLAS FRAMEWORK FOR
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE CASES
In order to provide plaintiffs with a fair opportunity to prove
intentional discrimination, despite the unavailability of direct evi-
dence, the Court in McDonnell Douglas developed an analytical
framework for proving discrimination 62 with circumstantial evi-
57. Troupe v. May Dep't Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 737 (7th Cir. 1994). Chief Judge Posner
wrote the opinion for the court, and thoughtfully analyzed the differences between direct and
circumstantial evidence. See id. at 736-37.
58. Id.
59. "Pretext" refers to a showing that a stated reason is not truthful, but instead conceals
the true reason. See Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981). Black's Law
Dictionary defines "pretext" as "ostensible reason or motive assigned or assumed as a color or
cover for the real reason or motive." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1187 (6th ed. 1990). The pretext
showing that a plaintiff may make in proving his or her case will be discussed at length later in
the Note. See infra Part IV.
60. 20 F.3d at 736.
61. 411 U.S. 792, 806 (1973) (acknowledging the correct outcome reached by the Eighth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, but holding that the circuit court erred in its reasoning for the decision).
The Supreme Court held that after the respondent had established his prima facie case of race
discrimination under Title VII, and after the petitioner had articulated a legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reason for the employment decision, the respondent should have been "afforded a
fair opportunity to demonstrate that the petitioner's assigned reason for refusing to re-employ
was a pretext or discriminatory in its application." Id. at 807.
62. See Belton, supra note 46, at 651-52.
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dence. 63 According to the Court, its task in McDonnell Douglas was
to clarify "the proper order and nature of proof in actions under Ti-
tle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."64 The plaintiff in McDonnell
Douglas, a black male and civil rights activist, was laid off from his
employment with McDonnell Douglas and denied reinstatement. 65
In his Title VII claim, the plaintiff insisted that McDonnell Douglas
refused to rehire him because of his race, but the defendant claimed
its refusal was based on the plaintiff's involvement in illegal civil
rights activities. 66 The Court developed a framework to assist the
factfinder in resolving factual disputes between two proffered, con-
flicting reasons for an employment decision. 67 Although the claim in
McDonnell Douglas68 arose under Title VII, lower federal courts
apply the analytical framework developed' in that case to claims
arising under the ADEA as well. 69 This borrowed application is
most often justified by the notion that "[tihe ADEA and Title VII
share common substantive features and also a common purpose:
'the elimination of discrimination in the workplace.' "70 While the
Supreme Court has not objected to lower courts' application of the
McDonnell Douglas framework to ADEA cases, the Court has never
definitively held that such application is correct.71
A. Step 1: The Plaintiffs Requirement to Establish a Prima Facie
Case
According to the McDonnell Douglas framework, the first
step a plaintiff must take toward proving a claim of intentional em-
63. 411 U.S. at 800-07. See also Dennard & Kelly, supra note 28, at 735 ("The McDonnell
Douglas . . .framework was developed to 'compensate' for the fact that direct evidence may be
difficult to supply in intentional discrimination cases.").
64. 411 U.S. at 793-94.
65. Id. at 794.
66. See id. at 796-97.
67. See id. at 800-07.
68. See id. at 792-807.
69. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 141 (2000) ("The Courts of
Appeals, including the Fifth Circuit in this case, have employed some variant of the framework
articulated in McDonnell Douglas to analyze ADEA claims that are based principally on circum-
stantial evidence."); see also Stokes v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 206 F.3d 420, 429 (4th
Cir. 2000); Galabya v. N.Y. Bd. of Ed., 202 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2000); Beaird v. Seagate Tech.
Inc., 145 F.3d 1159, 1165 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1054 (1998); Hindman v. Transkrit
Corp., 145 F.3d 986, 990-91 (8th Cir. 1998); Bodenheimer v. PPG Indus., Inc., 5 F.3d 955, 957
(5th Cir. 1993).
70. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 358 (1995).
71. The Court in O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp. stated that "[wie have never
had occasion to decide whether [the] application of [the McDonnell Douglas evidentiary frame-
work] to the ADEA is correct, but... we shall assume it." 517 U.S. 308, 311 (1996).
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ployment discrimination based upon circumstantial evidence is to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination. 72 The four elements
of an age discrimination prima facie case include:73 (1) that the
plaintiff was within the protected class under the ADEA because
the plaintiff was at least forty years of age; (2) that the plaintiff
was qualified for the position from which he or she was discharged;
(3) that the plaintiff was discharged from his or her position; and
(4) that the employer either filled the position, or sought or contin-
ued to seek applicants of the plaintiffs qualifications to fill the va-
cancy. 74
B. Step 2: The Defendant's Burden to Articulate a Legitimate,
Nondiscriminatory Reason
By successfully establishing all of the elements of the prima
facie case, the plaintiff creates a presumption of intentional dis-
crimination. 75 The burden then shifts to the employer to rebut the
presumption by raising a genuine issue of fact, by "articulat[ing]
some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason" for the employment
decision. 76 For example, an employer may explain that a plaintiff
was fired because he or she was excessively late to work.7 7 Or, an
employer may insist that a plaintiffs employment position was
eliminated because the company determined that customers could
be better served by reassigning plaintiffs responsibilities within
the company.
78
72. See 411 U.S. at 802.
73. The specifications of the prima facie case will vary according to the particular factual
circumstances surrounding each plaintiffs individual claim. For example, the elements of a
prima facie case for a discharge claim under Title VII alleging race discrimination will vary from
the elements of a prima facie case for a refusal to hire claim under the ADEA alleging age dis-
crimination. See id. at 802 n.13.
74. Id. The McDonnell Douglas Court actually listed the four elements necessary to estab-
lish a prima facie case in a Title VII claim based on racial discrimination: "(i) that he belongs to a
racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seek-
ing applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejec-
tion, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of
complainant's qualifications." Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 802.
77. See Clearwater v. Indep. Sch. Dist., 231 F.3d 1122, 1127 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding that de-
fendant satisfied its burden by articulating that plaintiff "failed to comply with the district's
requirement that all teachers be present in their classrooms when their students arrived at
school" due to the fact that that plaintiffs "late arrivals over a period of more than two years are
numerous and well-documented").
78. See Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344, 348-51 (6th Cir. 1998)
(holding that defendant successfully articulated a legitimate reason for its decision to terminate
the plaintiff when defendant offered that "plaintiffs position was eliminated due to the fact that
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According to a post-McDonnell Douglas decision by the
Court, Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, the bur-
den on the defendant is only one of production, not one of persua-
sion. 79 Therefore, the defendant need only articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the decision; the employer need not
persuade the factfinder that this truly was the reason for the deci-
sion.80 Rather, the burden of persuasion at all times remains with
the plaintiff to convince the factfinder that the employer made the
decision because of a discriminatory motive.8' If an employer fails to
carry its burden of production by failing to articulate a nondis-
criminatory and "legally sufficient" reason for the decision, the
court must decide the case in favor of the plaintiff.8 2
This burden of production, however, is usually easy for the
defendant to satisfy, as the defendant must only offer some non-
discriminatory reason, the validity or persuasiveness of which is
not considered by the factfinder at this point in the trial.8 3 The pur-
pose for the burden shift, according to the Supreme Court, is to al-
low the defendant "to meet the plaintiffs prima facie case by pre-
senting a legitimate reason for the action and to frame the factual
issue with sufficient clarity so that the plaintiff will have a full and
fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext."
8 4
C. Step 3: Demonstrating Pretext: What Must a Plaintiff Prove?
Once the employer successfully satisfies its burden of pro-
duction, the plaintiff has the "opportunity to demonstrate pre-
text."8 5 In doing so, the plaintiff must show, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that the employer's articulated reason for the em-
it was redundant with other positions at the Company and the Company's management wanted
to distribute his quality assurance duties to [other Company employees]").
79. 450 U.S. 248, 253-56 (1981). The burden of production is "the obligation ... to present
evidence on the element at issue ... of sufficient substance to permit the factfinder to act upon
it." Robert Belton, Burdens of Pleading and Proof in Discrimination Cases: Toward a Theory of
Procedural Justice, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1205, 1216 (1981). The burden of persuasion refers to "the
risk of uncertainty about an element's resolution .... The party having the burden of persuasion
on [a certain] element will lose if the factfinder's mind is in equipoise after he has considered all
the relevant evidence." Id. at 1216.
80. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.
81. Id. at 256.
82. " Id. at 255.
83. The defendant's burden to offer a nondiscriminatory reason is one of production. See id.
84. Id. at 255-56.
85. Id. According to the Burdine Court, the plaintiff may successfully establish pretext "ei-
ther directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the
employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of cre-
dence." Id. at 256.
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ployment decision was not the true motivation-that the articu-
lated reason is actually pretext for the employer's discriminatory
animus.8 6 Thus, after the defendant has articulated the legitimate
reason, the plaintiff carries the burden of showing pretext. It is this
burden on the plaintiff-what exactly satisfies a showing of pretext
in order to prevail on his or her claim-that was, for many years
after McDonnell Douglas, the subject of much dispute in the federal
courts87
The Burdine Court held that the burden on the plaintiff to
show that the defendant's proffered reason was pretext "merges
with the ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has been
the victim of intentional discrimination."88 Lower courts differed in
their interpretations of the Burdine holding.8 9 Two distinct inter-
pretations emerged regarding what a plaintiff must prove in order
to establish pretext and prevail on the claim: the Pretext-Only in-
terpretation and the Pretext-Plus interpretation. 90
1. Interpreting Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine:
Pretext-Only or Pretext-Plus?
a. The Pretext-Only View
Adopting the Pretext-Only view, some courts concluded that
Burdine required judgment for the plaintiff once the factfinder de-
termined that the employer's proffered reason was pretextual.91 The
86. See, e.g., Smith v. Leggett Wire Co., 220 F.3d 752, 759 (6th Cir. 2000) ("The plaintiff
may demonstrate that the defendant's explanation was merely pretext by showing (1) that the
proffered reason had no basis of fact, (2) that the proffered reason did not actually motivate the
termination, or (3) that the proffered reason was not sufficient to motivate the discharge." (citing
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 133-55 (2000))).
87. See infra Part IV.
88. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
89. For a thorough analysis of the post-Burdine circuit court decisions, see Terri L. Dill, St.
Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks: Refining the Burdens of Proof in Employment Discrimination
Litigation, 48 ARK. L. REV. 617, 627-31 (1995).
90. These terms have been assembled for the purpose of this Note from a variety of cases
and articles on the subject. Pretext Only, Pretext-Plus, and (later) Permissible Pretext are not
official terms, but are merely terms of art-shorthands used to describe three different ap-
proaches taken by courts.
91. See e.g., Lopez v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 930 F.2d 157, 161 (2d Cir. 1991) ("To show that
the proffered reasons are a pretext, a plaintiff need not directly prove discriminatory intent. It is
enough for the plaintiff to show that the articulated reasons were not the true reasons for the
defendant's actions."); Siegel v. Alpha Wire Corp., 894 F.2d 50, 53 (3d Cir. 1990) ("To defeat a
summary judgment motion based only on a defendant's proffer of a nondiscriminatory animus, a
plaintiff who has made a prima facie showing of discrimination, need only point to evidence
establishing a reasonable inference that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of
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rationale behind this interpretation was that evidence that an em-
ployer gave a false reason, coupled with the probative value of the
plaintiffs prima facie case of discrimination, necessarily implied
that the employer lied about the reason for the decision in order to
hide the true discriminatory intent.
92
b. The Pretext-Plus View
Other courts, however, rejected the notion that an employer's
false reason alone necessarily implies that the employer's true mo-
tivation was discriminatory in nature. 93 These courts, adopting the
Pretext-Plus standard, read the language in the Burdine holding94
as requiring the plaintiff to ultimately persuade the court not only
that the employer's proffered reason was pretextual, but also that
the employer's true motivation was to discriminate. 95 According to
these courts, this conclusion could not be presumed, but must be
proven by the plaintiff through additional evidence.96
2. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks: Setting the Standard
In order to clarify whether a finding of pretext mandated a
finding of discrimination, or whether the plaintiff must demon-
strate affirmative evidence of discrimination in addition to showing
pretext, the Supreme Court decided St. Mary's Honor Center v.
credence."); Perez v. Curcio, 841 F.2d 255, 258 (9th Cir. 1988) ("As long as [plaintifil has intro-
duced some evidence from which a jury could believe [plaintiffs] explanation rather than the
[employer's] explanation ... the case must go to a jury."); Bishopp v. Dist. of Columbia, 788 F.2d
781, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("Defendant's explanation for its decision was unworthy of credence as
a matter of law. Such a blatantly pretextual defense carries the seeds of its own destruction.").
92. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
93. Courts applying the Pretext-Plus standard include the First, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits.
See Hidalgo v. Overseas Condado Ins. Agencies, Inc., 120 F.3d 328, 335 (1st Cir. 1997) ("The
[plaintiffi must elucidate specific facts which would enable a jury to find that the reason given
[by the employer] was not only a sham, but a sham intended to cover up the employer's real
motive: age discrimination." (citing Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 9
(1st Cir. 1988))); Walthon v. Bisco Indus., Inc-, 119 F.3d 368, 370 (5th Cir. 1997) ("Plaintiff can-
not succeed by proving only that the defendant's proffered reason is pretextual," but instead
must demonstrate pretext " 'and that discrimination was the real reason' " (quoting St. Mary's
Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993))); Theard v. Glaxo, Inc., 47 F.3d 676, 680 (4th Cir.
1995) (holding that to prevail on a disparate treatment claim, plaintiff must prove " 'both that
[the defendant's] reason was false and that discrimination was the real reason' ") (emphasis
added) (quoting Hicks, 509 U.S. at 515).
94. 450 U.S. 248, 255-56 (1981).
95. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
96. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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Hicks.97 Hicks, a halfway house corrections officer, brought a claim
of racial discrimination against his employer, the Missouri Depart-
ment of Corrections and Human Resources, 98 under Title VII, alleg-
ing that he was demoted and later fired because he was black. 99 Al-
though the district court found that the plaintiff demonstrated that
his employer's proffered reasons for discharging him were pretex-
tual, it nonetheless held that the plaintiff failed to carry his ulti-
mate burden of proving that the discharge was motivated by dis-
crimination. 100 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit set aside
the district court's decision and held that the plaintiff was entitled
to judgment as a matter of law once he proved that all of the em-
ployer's proffered reasons were pretextual. 1°1 The Supreme Court
ultimately decided the case in favor of the employer, reversing the
Eighth Circuit, and holding that the plaintiff should not have been
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
10 2
In deciding the case, the Hicks Court made two statements
that raised more questions than they answered, and sparked much
subsequent debate. First, the Court held that the "factfinder's dis-
belief of the reasons put forward by the defendant ... may, together
with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show inten-
tional discrimination." 10 3 Thus, "rejection of the . . . proffered rea-
sons will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of inten-
tional discrimination, and . . . '[no] additional proof of discrimina-
tion is required.' "o104 This statement appeared to follow the Pretext-
Only line of reasoning-that the plaintiff may prove discrimination
simply by presenting a prima facie case and showing that the em-
ployer's proffered reason was pretext.
0 5
A few pages later in the opinion, however, the Court articu-
lated the second, and arguably contradictory, statement that the
employee must demonstrate "both that the reason [proffered by the
97. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 505-25 (holding that the trial court's rejection of an employer's as-
serted reasons for employment decisions made against a plaintiff does not entitle a plaintiff to
judgment as a matter of law).
98. St. Mary's Honor Center is a halfway house operated by the Missouri Department of
Corrections and Human Resources (MDCHR). After conducting an investigation of St. Mary's
Honor Center, MDCHR made extensive personnel changes, resulting in a change of Hick's su-
pervisors. It was after this personnel change occurred that the discrimination against Hicks
allegedly began. See id. at 504-05.
99. See id.
100. Id. at 508.
101. Id.
102. See id. at 524-25.
103. Id. at 511.
104. Id.
105. See infra Part III.C.l.(a)
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defendant] was false, and that discrimination was the real reason"
for the employment decision. 106 This statement appeared to contra-
dict the Pretext-Only theory, and seemed to insist that the plaintiff
cannot successfully prove discrimination simply by showing pretext,
but must instead provide additional affirmative evidence that "dis-
crimination was the real reason."10 7 The combination of the first
and second statements failed to resolve the dispute among lower
courts and provoked further disagreement between the circuit
courts on the issue of what a plaintiff must demonstrate in order to
prevail. 08 Indeed, the effectiveness of the Hicks decision as a means
to resolve the circuit split was, at the time the decision was handed
down, deemed to be "highly questionable. " 109
3. Interpreting Hicks: Permissible Pretext or Pretext-Plus?
As predicted, the lower court interpretations that followed
Hicks were as equally divided as they had been following Burdine.
Most courts," 0 as well as legal commentators and scholars,"'
agreed that the Hicks decision eliminated the Pretext-Only inter-
pretation. Many of those analyzing the decision felt that the Hicks
standard imposed an unwarranted heightened burden on plaintiffs
to prove their disparate treatment cases. They argued that under
Hicks, plaintiffs would be required to persuade the factfinder that
intentional discrimination did, in fact, occur, with a showing of
what essentially amounts to direct evidence of the employer's dis-
criminatory motive. 1 2 Two primary interpretations resulted from
Hicks. The first interpretation, the Permissible Pretext approach
106. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 515 (emphasis added).
107. Id.
108. The Harvard Law Review Association found it "richly ironic that Justice Scalia [the au-
thor of the Hicks opinion], so often the champion of bright-line doctrines and simple rules, has in
fact muddied the McDonnell Douglas doctrine by raising more questions than he purport[s] to
answer." Harvard L. Rev. Ass'n, Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination, 109
HARV. L. REV. 1568, 1593 (1996).
109. Id.
110. See, e.g., Rothmeier v. Inv. Advisers, Inc., 85 F.3d 1328, 1334 (8th Cir. 1996) ("The Court
[in Hicks] thus rejected the pretext-only position.").
111. See, e.g., Julie Tang & Theodore M. McMillian, Eighth Circuit Employment Discrimina-
tion Law: Hicks and its Impact on Summary Judgment, 41 ST. Louis U. L.J. 519, 524 (1997)
(indicating that the Hicks decision clarified that, contrary to the Pretext-Only theory, the fact-
finder's rejection of the employer's explanation for the employment decision "does not compel
judgment for the plaintiff").
112. See, e.g., Leland Ware, Inferring Intent from Proof of Pretext: Resolving the Summary
Judgment Confusion in Employment Discrimination Cases Alleging Disparate Treatment, 4
EMPLOYEE RTs. & EMp. POL'Y J. 37, 56 (2000) (discussing a general reluctance on the part of
courts to find in favor of plaintiffs in employment discrimination suits).
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adopted by several circuit courts, would permit, but not require, the
factfinder to find for the plaintiff upon the plaintiffs establishment
of a prima facie case, and a showing that the defendant's articu-
lated reason for the decision was pretextual. 113 Meanwhile, courts
adopting the second interpretation, the continuation of the Pretext-
Plus standard, would not permit a verdict for the plaintiff unless
the plaintiff offered additional affirmative evidence that the defen-
dant provided a false pretextual reason to conceal his actual dis-
criminatory intent.1
14
IV. REEVES V. SANDERSON PLUMBING PRODUCTS: CLEARING
UP THE CONFUSION OVER THE PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENTIARY
BURDEN
A. Factual and Procedural Background of Reeves
Finally, in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, the
Court once again entertained a case concerning "the amount of evi-
dence necessary to sustain a jury's verdict that an employer unlaw-
fully discriminated"115 in order to clear up the controversy sparked
by the Hicks decision. 116 The plaintiff, fifty-seven-year-old Roger
Reeves, was employed by Sanderson Plumbing for forty years prior
113. See Combs v. Meadowcraft Plantation Patterns, Inc., 106 F.3d 1519, 1529 (11th Cir.
1997) ("We understand the Hicks Court to have been unanimous that disbelief of the defendant's
proffered reasons, together with the prima facie case, is sufficient circumstantial evidence to
support a finding of discrimination [and] to survive summary judgment."); EEOC v. Yenkin-
Majestic Paint Corp., 112 F.3d 831, 835 (6th Cir. 1997) ("The law allows a factfinder to infer
intentional discrimination from proof of the prima facie case coupled with a disbelief of the prof-
fered reason for the employer's action, but such an inference is not required."); Waldron v. SL
Indus., Inc., 56 F.3d 491, 495 (3d Cir. 1995) ("If the plaintiff has pointed to evidence sufficient to
discredit the defendant's proffered reasons, to survive summary judgment the plaintiff need not
also come forward with additional evidence of discrimination beyond his or her prima facie
case.").
114. See Smith v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 202 F.3d 234, 248 (4th Cir. 2000) ("[TIhe plaintiff
must ... demonstrate that the employer's reason was mere pretext for retaliation by showing
'both that the reason was false and that discrimination was the real reason for the challenged
conduct.' "); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 197 F.3d 688, 689 (5th Cir. 1999) (over-
turning a jury verdict for the plaintiff, holding that petitioner had not introduced sufficient evi-
dence to sustain the jury's verdict), rev'd, 530 U.S. 133 (2000); Lattimore v. Polaroid Corp., 99
F.3d 456, 457 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding that trial court should have granted defendant's motion for
judgment as a matter of law because although the plaintiff demonstrated pretext, the plaintiff
failed to show additional evidence of discriminatory intent as required under Hicks to send the
case to the jury).
115. 530 U.S. at 137.
116. 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993).
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to being terminated from his employment in 1995.117 Reeves filed a
complaint against his employer, alleging that his termination was
in violation of the ADEA because it was motivated by his age.
118
At trial, after Reeves established his prima facie case of age
discrimination under the ADEA, the defendant asserted that
Reeves was discharged not because of his age, but as a result of his
failure to maintain accurate attendance records. 119 In an effort to
demonstrate that his employer's proffered reason was simply pre-
text, Reeves introduced evidence that he had, contrary to the em-
ployer's allegation, maintained all attendance records accurately.
120
Furthermore, Reeves insisted that Powe Chestnut, the company's
director of manufacturing, "had demonstrated age-based animus in
his dealings with" Reeves.121
The jury returned a judgment for Reeves, but the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that Reeves had
failed to introduce sufficient evidence to sustain the jury's finding
of discrimination. 122 The Fifth Circuit explained that while Reeves
may have successfully demonstrated that his employer's articulated
reason for the firing was pretextual, in order to justify a judgment
in his favor, Reeves needed to present "sufficient evidence that his
age motivated [the defendant's] employment decision.' 23 In making
this determination, the court scrutinized Reeves's additional cir-
cumstantial evidence of discrimination surrounding his discharge.
The court specifically noted that age-based remarks124 made by
Chestnut "were not made in the direct context of Reeves's termina-
tion" and were therefore low in probative value. 125 On this basis, the
appellate court concluded that Reeves did not present sufficient
evidence for a jury to conclude the ultimate issue of discrimina-
tion. 12
6
117. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 137.
118. See id.
119. See id. at 137-38, 142-43.
120. See id. at 138, 144.
121. Id. at 138.
122. See id. at 138-39.
123. Id. at 139.
124. The remarks allegedly made by Chestnut were specifically, "You are so old, you must
have come over on the Mayflower" and "you are too damn old to do your job." Id. at 151.
125. Id. at 152.
126. See id.
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B. The Supreme Court's Reversal and Opinion
In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court reversed the de-
cision of the Fifth Circuit, holding that the circuit court "miscon-
ceived the evidentiary burden borne by plaintiffs who attempt to
prove intentional discrimination through indirect evidence. "127
Clearing up previous confusion stemming from its opinion in Hicks,
the Court held that in order for the plaintiff to prevail, the trier of
fact must disbelieve the employer's articulated reason: "[Ilt is per-
missible for the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of discrimina-
tion from the falsity of the employer's explanation." 128 In other
words, the Court held that in order for a court to uphold a verdict
for the plaintiff, the plaintiff must demonstrate pretext, but is not
obligated to present additional affirmative evidence proving dis-
crimination. The pretext is sufficient for a jury to reasonably infer
the ultimate issue of discrimination because "the factfinder is enti-
tled to consider a party's dishonesty about a material fact as 'af-
firmative evidence of guilt.' ",129 The Court was careful to emphasize
that the standard is one of Permissible Pretext, rather than Pre-
text-Only. 130 A showing of pretext by the plaintiff in a disparate
treatment case, thus, will permit a jury to find in favor of the plain-
tiff, but it will not require the jury to do so. Consequently, the
Court directed lower federal courts that had previously adopted the
Pretext-Plus standard to rethink the evidentiary burden for a
plaintiff in a disparate treatment case.131
The Court did not precisely define, as a matter of law, the
circumstances in which plaintiffs would be required to submit addi-
tional evidence beyond the prima facie case and showing of pretext
in order to survive a defendant's motion. Justice Ginsburg, in her
concurrence, pointed out the need for further specifications on this
point.132 The Court held, however, that the employer in Reeves
should not have been entitled to judgment as a matter of law be-
cause after establishing pretext, Reeves introduced additional evi-
127. Id. at 146.
128. Id. at 146-47.
129. Id. at 147 (citing Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 296 (1992)).
130. See id. ("lit is permissible for the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of discrimination
from the falsity of the employer's explanation.").
131. Id. at 147-48.
132. Id. at 154 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) ("[Ilt may be incumbent on the Court, in an appro-
priate case, to define more precisely the circumstances in which plaintiffs will be required to
submit evidence beyond these two categories in order to survive a motion for judgment as a mat-
ter of law. I anticipate that such circumstances will be uncommon.").
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dence that his employer "was motivated by age-based animus and
was principally responsible for [Reeves's] firing."1 33 This additional
evidence came in the form of several statements made by Reeves's
supervisor at Sanderson Plumbing Products. 134 It was the Court's
treatment of these statements that may be characterized as the
second major impact of the Reeves decision-a new approach to the
so-called Stray Remarks Doctrine.
V. THE STRAY REMARKS DOCTRINE: ORIGINS, APPLICATIONS,
AND INTERPRETATIONS
A. Origins of the Doctrine
While Reeves may have resolved the legal issue of the plain-
tiffs ultimate burden of proof in an employment discrimination
claim, the decision left another question of law open to the interpre-
tation of the lower federal courts. Although not explicitly noted in
the decision, the question post-Reeves remains whether the Stray
Remarks Doctrine, first outlined in Justice O'Connor's concurring
opinion in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,135 is still good law, as ap-
plied in disparate treatment cases where plaintiffs attempt to prove
their cases by indirect evidence.
In the portion of her concurrence in Price Waterhouse that
included a discussion of what does and does not constitute direct
evidence of discrimination, Justice O'Connor contrasted direct evi-
dence from what she characterized as "stray remarks in the work-
place."136 In what has come to be known as the Stray Remarks Doc-
trine, Justice O'Connor insisted a plaintiffs presentation of stray
remarks-defined as "statements by nondecisionmakers, or state-
ments by decisionmakers unrelated to the decisional process it-
self'-are not direct evidence. 137 Thus, Justice O'Connor reasoned,
evidence of stray remarks cannot satisfy the plaintiffs initial bur-
den of showing discriminatory intent on the part of the employer,
sufficient to shift the burden of persuasion to the employer under
133. Id. at 151.
134. See supra note 124.
135. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 277-79 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Justice O'Connor's concurrence has been described as "a trenchant, universally accepted example
of what is not direct evidence: stray remarks .... ." Fernandes v. Costa Bros. Masonry, Inc., 199
F.3d 572, 581 (1st Cir. 1999).
136. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 277 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
137. Id.
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the Price Waterhouse analytical framework. 138 In contrast, a clear
showing by the plaintiff of workplace remarks that do rise to the
level of direct evidence creates a presumption of intentional dis-
crimination. 139 When faced with such a clear showing of direct evi-
dence, it is reasonable for a court to place a higher burden on the
employer. According to Justice O'Connor's concurrence, the issue of
whether a remark may be characterized as direct evidence, or
rather as "stray," turns upon who made the statement and the con-
text in which the statement was made.
140
In articulating her case of sex discrimination against her
employer, Price Waterhouse, the plaintiff offered examples of sexist
attitudes held by many Price Waterhouse partners through evi-
dence of their statements made to her. These remarks indicated to
her that "in order to improve her chances for partnership," she
should " 'walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more
femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jew-
elry.' "141 Other partners commented that the plaintiff was "macho,"
and advised her to "take a course at charm school." 142 Moreover, the
plaintiff showed that such comments played a significant role in the
decision to deny her a partnership position. 43 Justice O'Connor
concluded that the remarks presented by the plaintiff were not
"stray" in nature, and instead, constituted "direct evidence that de-
cisionmakers placed substantial negative reliance on an illegitimate
criterion in reaching their decision."
1 44
B. Justifications for the Doctrine: The Employer's Perspective
The purpose of the Stray Remarks Doctrine is to distinguish
between two types of statements: (1) statements of a discriminatory
nature that tend to show that a discriminatory attitude motivated
the person who made the statement to make an imminent employ-
ment decision; and (2) statements of a discriminatory nature that
were made in a workplace setting, but do not necessarily demon-
strate that discrimination motivated an employer's particular deci-
sion. 145 Lower courts deduced from Justice O'Connor's concurrence
that in order for a remark to constitute direct evidence of an em-
138. Id. For a description of the Price Waterhouse analytical framework, see supra note 43.
139. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258.
140. See id. at 277 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
141. Id. at 235.
142. Id.
143. See id. at 251.




ployer's discriminatory motive: (1) the remark must have been
made by the decisionmaker, or by someone in a position of influence
over the decisionmaker, within the scope of employment; (2) the
remark must be related to the challenged employment decision; and
(3) the remark must have been made in the context of the employ-
ment decision. That is, the plaintiff must demonstrate a causal link
between the remark and the decision. 146
The justification for the Stray Remarks Doctrine, from the
employer's perspective, is ostensibly twofold. First, an employer
should be able to make difficult employment decisions for whatever
nondiscriminatory reasons he or she chooses. Second, the employer
is under no legal obligation to feel personally a certain way about
his or her employees, to promote sensitivity among employees, or to
actively prohibit employees from exhibiting discriminatory behavior
toward their coworkers. 147 The only statutory restriction on the em-
ployer is that he or she cannot allow discriminatory factors to moti-
vate employment decisions. 148 Thus, under the Stray Remarks Doc-
trine, an employer should not be liable for intentional discrimina-
tion based upon remarks made by his or her employees or cowork-
ers, if those employees or coworkers had no influence over the chal-
lenged employment decision. 149 Likewise, even if the employer him-
self made discriminatory comments in the past, as long as those
comments were not made at, or close to, the time of the adverse
employment decision, they should not indicate discriminatory mo-
tive. 15
0
146. See, e.g., Cooley v. Carmike Cinemas, Inc., 25 F.3d 1325, 1330-32 (6th Cir. 1994); Turner
v. N. Am. Rubber, Inc., 979 F.2d 55, 59 (5th Cir. 1992).
147. While Title VII prohibits discrimination with respect to the "terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment," it clearly does not prohibit discriminatory attitudes, views, or thoughts
themselves. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994); see also Christopher Y. Chen, Note, Rethinking the
Direct Evidence Requirement: A Suggested Approach in Analyzing Mixed-Motives Discrimination
Claims, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 899, 919 (2001) (arguing that "[o]nly when those [discriminatory]
thoughts and attitudes constitute a 'motivating factor for any employment practice' may an em-
ployer be liable under Title VII").
148. See § 2000e-2(a)(1).
149. See Hunt v. City of Markham, 219 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that "the fact
that someone who is not involved in the employment decision ... expressed discriminatory feel-
ings is not evidence .. .[of discriminatory motivation"); Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., 154 F.3d 344, 354 (6th Cir. 1998) ("In assessing the relevancy of a discriminatory remark,
we look first at the identity of the speaker. An isolated discriminatory remark made by one with
no managerial authority over the challenged personnel decisions is not considered indicative of
age discrimination.").
150. See, e.g., Russell v. Acme-Evans Co., 51 F.3d 64, 68 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that a threat
of a racially discriminatory nature that was made fifteen years prior to the employer's decision to
terminate the plaintiffs employment was so "tenuously related to the alleged discriminatory
actions by supervisors many years later" that it constituted an irrelevant stray remark).
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Defenders of the Stray Remarks Doctrine insist that plain-
tiffs should not be entitled to make "federal cases" of discrimination
against their employers based merely on a few isolated remarks.
151
For example, the First Circuit expressed this view in Gray v. New
England Telephone & Telegraph Co.,152 finding that "[a] reasonable
inference cannot be drawn from these isolated statements (made by
a lower level management employee in a department which had
nothing to do with the discharge decision many months before [the
plaintiff] was fired) that age discrimination was a determinative
factor in [the] decision to fire [the plaintiff] ."153 The Seventh Circuit
articulated the fine distinction between stray and non-stray re-
marks in Hunt v. City of Markham.154 This case involved four white
police officers who sued the City of Markham, Illinois, alleging race
and age discrimination by the minority-controlled municipal gov-
ernment in violation of both Title VII and the ADEA.155 In evaluat-
ing the plaintiffs' evidence of certain comments made by city offi-
cials, 156 the Hunt court stated that "the fact that someone who is
not involved in the employment decision of which the plaintiff com-
plains expressed discriminatory feelings is not evidence that the
decision had a discriminatory motivation."1 57 The court emphasized,
however, that a different case exists when the decisionmakers
themselves express discriminatory feelings "around the time of, and
. . . in reference to, the adverse employment action complained
of."158 Under this situation, a trier of fact may infer "that the deci-
sion makers were influenced by those feelings in making their deci-
sion."15 9 The Seventh Circuit eventually concluded that the remarks
introduced into evidence by the plaintiffs were not "stray" because
the mayor and city officials who made the remarks had considerable
influence over the decisions of the city council, including the promo-
tion of police officers, and thus, the plaintiffs.160
151. See Gray v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 792 F.2d 251, 254-55 (ist Cir. 1986).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 255.
154. 219 F.3d at 651.
155. See id. at 651-52.
156. The plaintiffs' evidence included statements made by the Markham mayor and other
black officials regarding the city's need to " 'get rid of all the old white police officers' " and com-
ments directed to one of the plaintiffs, such as" 'when are you going to quit so we can bring these
young black men up?' " and " 'it is the blacks' turn to self-govern in Markham, and if you are
white, get out.' "Id. at 652.
157. Id.
158. Id.




C. Lower Courts' Expansion of the Stray Remarks Doctrine
In applying the Stray Remarks Doctrine to disparate treat-
ment cases, several lower federal courts have expanded the doctrine
in two ways: first, by applying it to cases in which the plaintiff pre-
sented the remarks as indirect, rather than direct, evidence; and
second, by evaluating both whether the remarks constituted direct
evidence, and whether the remarks had any value at all to the
plaintiff's case.
1. Workplace Remarks as Indirect Evidence
Explicit remarks made by an employer and directed at an
employee could be considered either direct or indirect evidence of
discriminatory animus, depending on both the content of the re-
marks and the context in which the remarks were made. 1 1 Al-
though the notion of stray remarks in the workplace was first in-
troduced in a direct evidence case of discrimination (as a means of
identifying evidence in the form of workplace statements which do
not constitute direct evidence), 162 several courts have applied the
Stray Remarks Doctrine to indirect evidence cases as well. 163 These
courts evaluate workplace remarks offered as circumstantial evi-
dence to demonstrate pretext (to prove that a discriminatory motiva-
tion was more likely than the alternative explanation offered by the
defendant) in much the same way that Justice O'Connor evaluated
such remarks in determining whether they constituted direct evi-
dence. 16
4
For instance, in EEOC v. MCI Telecommunications Corp.,
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, deciding
a race discrimination claim brought under Title VII, held that the
plaintiffs evidence of race discrimination was insufficient to dem-
161. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 277-79 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
162. Id.
163. See, e.g., Wallace v. Methodist Hosp. Sys., 85 F. Supp. 2d 699, 711 (S.D. Tex. 2000) ([A]
workplace remark may be so deficient.., as to be a stray remark wholly lacking in probative
value even as 'indirect' evidence of discrimination." (citing Boyd v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 158 F.3d
326, 329-30 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1051 (1999))).
164. See Smith v. Leggett Wire Co., 220 F.3d 752, 759 (6th Cir. 2000); Santiago-Ramos v.
Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 55 (1st Cir. 2000) (stating that "discriminatory
comments . . . made by the key decisionmaker or those in a position to influence the decision-
maker" can be utilized by the plaintiff to establish pretext).
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onstrate that the defendant's proffered reason 165 was pretext. 166 The
court stated that the plaintiffs evidence amounted to nothing more
than stray remarks, as the plaintiff failed to "establish a nexus be-
tween the statements made and the termination decision." 167 Thus,
according to the Southern District of Texas, "[wlhen discriminatory
comments are vague and remote in time and administrative hierar-
chy, they are no more than 'stray remarks,' insufficient to establish
a pretext to discriminate."
68
2. Are Workplace Remarks Probative at All?
Several lower courts, applying the Stray Remarks Doctrine
to circumstantial evidence discrimination cases, have further ex-
panded application of the doctrine to include the notion that certain
discriminatory remarks are not relevant to a determination of
unlawful intent, irrespective of how egregious those statements
may be. 169 These courts have held that discriminatory remarks not
made by the decisionmaker himself, or not made in direct relation
to the employment decision, are not only not direct evidence of dis-
crimination, but are also not probative of discrimination at all. 70
For example, in its decision in Wallace v. Methodist Hospital Sys-
tem, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, ap-
plying rules articulated by the Fifth Circuit, concluded that if a
workplace remark is deemed to be a "stray remark," then it is
"wholly lacking in probative value even as 'indirect' evidence of dis-
crimination." 171
165. MCI insisted that the plaintiffs termination was "based on her well-documented per-
formance problems." 820 F. Supp. 300, 309 (S.D. Tex. 1993).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 310.
168. Id. at 309 (emphasis added) (citing Guthrie v. Tifco Indus., 941 F.2d 374, 379 (5th Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 908 (1992)).
169. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Lance, Inc., No. 93-1298, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 10225 (4th Cir.
May 9, 1994). The Fourth Circuit held that racially disparaging remarks made by a supervi-
sor/decisionmaker toward the plaintiff (repeatedly calling the plaintiff a "stupid nigger") were
deemed to be irrelevant to the plaintiffs case, as the plaintiff had "failed to show any link be-
tween (the foregoing] statements and the [decisionmaker's] decision to terminate him." Id. at *5,
9.
170. See, e.g., Wallace v. Methodist Hosp. Sys., 85 F. Supp. 2d 699, 701, 712-16 (S.D. Tex.
2000) (granting defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law and determining that the
remarks offered by the plaintiff had weak probative value).
171. Id. at 711. The Wallace court set out four criteria for determining if the remark in ques-
tion had probative value: (1) whether the remarks "were related to the protected class of persons
of which the plaintiff is a member"; (2) whether the remarks "were proximate in time to the
employment decision at issue"; (3) whether the remarks "were made by an individual with au-
thority over the employment decision at issue"; and (4) whether the remarks "were related to the
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D. Critique of the Stray Remarks Doctrine and Its Application by
Lower Courts
Critics of the Stray Remarks Doctrine assess both the doc-
trine itself and also the application and expansion of the doctrine
by lower courts.
1. Critique of the Doctrine Itself
Critics of the Stray Remarks Doctrine most often attack two
of the three criteria for what constitutes a nonstray remark: (1) the
requirement that the remark must be made by the decisionmaker;
and (2) the requirement that the remark be made in the direct con-
text of the decisionmaking process. 172 Professor Anne Lawton dis-
cussed the fallacy of the first requirement in her recent article in
the Minnesota Law Review. 173 As Professor Lawton indicates, the
requirement that the remark must be made by the actual decision-
maker in order for it not to be "stray" "ignore [s] the impact of work-
place attitudes on supervisory decisions.' 74 Citing the "rational
bias theory," Lawton surmises that "'individuals who do not them-
selves hold negative prejudices may nonetheless 'rationally' choose
to discriminate . . . if they believe those in power over them and
their careers expect or approve of such behavior .... , "175 Certainly,
in Lawton's view, the trier of fact should consider discriminatory or
biased remarks made by any employees or supervisors, in its de-
termination of whether discrimination occurred, regardless of the
position the speaker had in the decisionmaking process. 176 Thus, the
decisionmaker requirement should not be applied formalistically.
Rather, several factors should be considered, including the
speaker's influence over the decisionmaking process and ability to
bring about a particular adverse decision, and the capacity of the
speaker, and others like him, to create a hostile work environment
that could taint the judgment of the ultimate decisionmaker.
Lower courts vary on their willingness to admit evidence of
discriminatory animus displayed by individuals who were not the
actual decisionmaker of the adverse decision. Several of these
employment decision at issue." Id. (citing Krystek v. Univ. of S. Miss., 164 F.3d 251, 256 (5th Cir.
1999); Brown v. CSC Logic, Inc., 82 F.3d 651, 655 (5th Cir. 1996)). Id.
172. See infra Part V.D.1.
173. Lawton, supra note 55, at 633-42.
174. Id. at 641.
175. Id. (quoting Susan Trentham & Laurie Larwood, Gender Discrimination and the Work-
place: An Examination of Rational Bias Theory, 38 SEx ROLES 1, 2 (1998)).
176. Id.
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courts have applied the decisionmaker requirement of the doctrine
stringently, unwilling to admit evidence of any comments not made
by the actual decisionmaker.
177
Many other courts, however, have demonstrated leniency in
their evaluation of the decisionmaker criterion, holding that super-
visors who do not terminate the employee directly, but who recom-
mend the termination, or who simply create a hostile work envi-
ronment, may be considered a "decisionmaker" for the purposes of
the Stray Remarks Doctrine. 78 For example, in Shager v. Upjohn
Co., the Seventh Circuit decided that remarks made by Mr. Lehnst,
one of the company's district managers, demonstrated his age-based
animosity toward the plaintiff.179 Although the court determined
that the company's decision to fire the plaintiff was ultimately
made, not by Lehnst, but by a separate committee, the court found
that as a result of Lehnst's recommendations to the committee, the
committee was consequently acting on behalf of Lehnst's wishes.
80
As the court explained, the committee "acted as the conduit of
Lehnst's prejudice-his cat's paw."181 Thus, the decision of the
177. See, e.g., Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344, 354 (6th Cir. 1998).
The Sixth Circuit's interpretation of the Stray Remarks Doctrine in Ercegovich was discussed
earlier in the Note. See supra note 149.
178. See, e.g., EEOC v. Manville Sales Corp., 27 F.3d 1089, 1093-95 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding
that "age-related comments by various supervisors of the plaintiff [will] support a finding of
discrimination even though a higher level official made the final decision to terminate him");
Malarkey v. Texaco, Inc., 983 F.2d 1204, 1210 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that statements made by
nondecisionmakers were properly received "because they showed the pervasive corporate hostil-
ity towards [plaintiffl and supported her claim that she did not receive a promotion due to her
employer's retaliatory animus"); Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 406 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding
that employer is responsible for district manager's "violation of the Act by virtue of the [district
manager's] status as an agent acting within the scope of his authority, even though the [district
manager's] conduct was willful and unauthorized"); Lockhart v. Westinghouse Credit Corp., 879
F.2d 43, 54 (3d Cir. 1989) (insisting that "[w]hen a major company executive speaks, 'everybody
listens' in the corporate hierarchy"); Miles v. M.N.C. Corp., 750 F.2d 867, 875 (11th Cir. 1985)
(holding that a racial slur made by a supervisor who was "closely involved in the hiring evalua-
tions" was admissible); Cline v. Roadway Express, Inc., 689 F.2d 481, 488 (4th Cir. 1982) (finding
that plaintiff was discharged under a general hiring policy that was discriminatory, as demon-
strated by manager's remarks).
179. Shager, 913 F.3d at 400. The comments included statements that "[tihese older people
don't much like or much care for us baby boomers, but there isn't much they can do about it" and
"the old guys know how to get around things." Id.
180. See id. at 405.
181. Id. Several other circuits have adopted Judge Posner's "cat's paw" theory when analyz-
ing workplace remarks uttered by individuals other than the official decisionmaker. See, e.g.,
Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 227 (5th Cir. 2000); Lacks v. Ferguson Reor-
ganized Sch. Dist., 147 F.3d 718, 725 (8th Cir. 1998); Willis v. Marion County Auditor's Office,
118 F.3d 542, 547 (7th Cir. 1997); Delli Santi v. CNA Ins. Cos., 88 F.3d 192, 200 n.11 (3d Cir.
1996).
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committee was effectively motivated by age-based discrimination. 8 2
Shager is thus an example of the court finding that remarks made
by an individual who was not technically the decisionmaker were
not "stray" in nature.1
83
Critics of the Stray Remarks Doctrine also object to what
they consider the needlessness of the requirement that a nonstray
remark must be made in the context of the decisionmaking proc-
ess. 8 4 As Professor Robert Brookins emphasizes, courts that dis-
miss the probative value of noncontextual statements are "mis-
guided."18 5 Decisionmakers who make racist, sexist, or age-based
statements outside the office are still motivated by those attitudes
and that mindset in the workplace, even if they do not make similar
explicit statements there. 8 6 As Linda Hamilton Krieger asserts in
her application of cognitive psychology to disparate treatment the-
ory, discriminatory attitudes do not necessarily manifest them-
selves at the moment of decisionmaking 8 7 Rather, stereotypes and
prejudices shape "bias decisionmaking long before the 'moment of
decision.' "1188 In the words of Professor Brookins, "[C]ommon sense
suggests that one whose sexist attitude is strong enough to trigger
explicit, public, sexist statements outside the decisionmaking arena
will hardly leave that attitude at the door when making employ-
ment decisions . ..within that secluded arena." 18 9 Such an argu-
ment, as made by Professor Brookins, necessarily turns on the as-
sumption that discriminatory remarks are not made in vacuums,
but are, instead, manifestations of underlying discriminatory atti-
tudes. 190
Professor Lawton, relying on this assumption, questions the
direct context requirement, stating that "it is unclear why racist
remarks, even when removed in time from the adverse employment
decision, are not probative of the employer's intent."191 For Lawton,
182. Shager, 913 F.2d at 405.
183. Id.
184. See infra notes 185-97 and accompanying text.
185. Robert Brookins, Mixed-Motives, Title VII, and Removing Sexism from Employment: The
Reality and the Rhetoric, 59 ALB. L. REV. 1, 114 (1995).
186. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach
to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1211 (1995) (ar-
guing that a flaw in the theory of disparate treatment discrimination lies in the assumption,
under that theory, that discrimination is motivational, rather than cognitive).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Brookins, supra note 185, at 111-12.
190. Id. at 114 (asserting that "sexist statements are ... the spawn of sexist attitudes").
191. Lawton, supra note 55, at 638.
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concluding that statements not made in direct context of a decision
lack probative value assumes that an individual's discriminatory
attitudes have changed somehow between the time a remark was
made and the time the decision was made. 192 Such a change in atti-
tude is, after all, unlikely, based upon the persistence of stereotypes
in our society.1
93
Just as the lower courts vary in the stringency with which
they apply the decisionmaker requirement, some courts apply the
direct context requirement less rigorously than do other courts. 1
94
For example, the Fifth Circuit, in EEOC v. Manville Sales Corp.,
adopted a more lenient application of the requirement, holding that
even if a long period of time elapses from the moment a remark was
made until the moment when the adverse decision was made, this
duration does not suggest that the remark is irrelevant. 195 Indeed,
according to the court, the period may indicate "a pattern of dis-
criminatory comments," and as such, evidence of any remark is "di-
rectly relevant to showing the existence of discriminatory motive on
the part of [the employer] ."196 While the court conceded that the
amount of time that had passed might be pertinent to the weight
that should be given the evidence, that determination should be
made by the trier of fact; it is not for the court to decide at the
summary judgment phase. 197
2. Critique of Lower Courts' Application and Expansion of the
Doctrine
Several legal theorists view the application by many lower
courts of the Stray Remarks Doctrine to circumstantial evidence
cases' 98 as an unwarranted expansion of the language articulated
by Justice O'Connor in Price Waterhouse.199 Professor Ann
McGinley, assessing the refusal by many lower courts to consider
192. See id.
193. See Patricia G. Devine & Andrew J. Elliot, Are Racial Stereotypes Really Fading? The
Princeton Trilogy Revisited, 21 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1139, 1147 (1995) (noting
the difficulty for individuals of "breaking the prejudice habit" due to the ingrained nature of
stereotypes).
194. See, e.g., EEOC v. Manville Sales Corp., 27 F.3d 1089, 1094 (5th Cir. 1994); cf Haskell
v. Kaman Corp., 743 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that the district court erred in admitting
statements, made by the employer over a period of several years, that were unrelated to the
plaintiff).
195. 27 F.3d at 1094.
196. Id.
197. See id.
198. See supra Part V.
199. 490 U.S. 228, 277-79 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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discriminatory remarks as circumstantial evidence to prove pretext,
characterized such an interpretation of the doctrine as a "distortion
of Justice O'Connor's statement in Price Waterhouse that applies
only to the creation of an inference of discrimination."
200
Professor Lawton, agreeing with Professor McGinley, em-
phasized in her recent article that Justice O'Connor did not state in
Price Waterhouse201 that stray remarks were "not probative of in-
tent in circumstantial evidence cases" where a jury may, based
upon the totality of the plaintiffs evidence, reach an inference of
discrimination. 20 2 Rather, Justice O'Connor limited her discussion
of stray remarks to those remarks that do not constitute direct evi-
dence, and therefore, cannot create a presumption of intentional
discrimination. 20 3 Despite commentary by legal scholars such as
Professors McGinley and Lawton, several lower federal courts, prior
to the Reeves 20 4 decision, continued to determine that certain re-
marks, discriminatory in nature, were legally irrelevant to the ul-
timate determination that a plaintiff had successfully proved his or
her case of intentional discrimination by an employer.
20 5
E. The Supreme Court's Treatment of "Stray Remarks" in Reeves
In Reeves, the Supreme Court addressed the probative value
of remarks allegedly made by the plaintiffs supervisor, and identi-
fied the role that evidence of such remarks should play in proving
pretext and the ultimate issue of intentional discrimination. 20 6 At
trial, Reeves testified that on one occasion, his supervisor, Chest-
nut, said to him that "he was so old he must have come over on the
Mayflower," and that, on another occasion, the supervisor remarked
that Reeves was "too damn old to do his job." 20 7 Reviewing the trial
court's admission of the statements, the Fifth Circuit held that the
plaintiffs evidence of his employer's age-based comments, despite
its "potentially damaging nature," constituted "stray remarks" be-
cause it was clear that these comments "were not made in the direct
context of Reeves's termination."208 Thus, the Fifth Circuit deter-
200. McGinley, supra note 54, at 476.
201. 490 U.S. at 277-79 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
202. Lawton, supra note 55, at 636.
203. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 277-79 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
204. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 137-54 (2000).
205. See supra notes 151-160 and accompanying text.
206. 530 U.S. at 151-54.
207. Id. at 151.
208. Id. at 152-53.
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mined that due to the fact that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a
causal link between the remarks and the decision to fire Reeves,
the remarks were considered "stray" and could not assist the plain-
tiff in establishing pretext. 20 9
The Supreme Court criticized the Fifth Circuit's evaluation
and insisted that in light of the "additional evidence that Chestnut
was motivated by age-based animus and was principally responsi-
ble for petitioner's firing," there was sufficient evidence for a jury to
find that the employer had intentionally discriminated. 210 Thus, the
Court's opinion suggests that even if remarks are not made in the
direct context of the employment decision, they still should be given
weight in assessing discriminatory animus. 211
VI. THE STRAY REMARKS DOCTRINE AFTER REEVES
A. Interpreting the Court's Opinion
The Reeves decision reemphasized that in order to demon-
strate pretext successfully, a plaintiff does not need to proffer af-
firmative, direct evidence of the employer's discriminatory mo-
tive. 212 Furthermore, the Court suggested that in an effort to show
pretext, a plaintiff may provide evidence of discriminatory remarks
made by his or her employer, even if those remarks were not made
in the direct context of the decisionmaking process. 213 The Court,
through its holding in Reeves, appears to be instructing lower
courts to relax their application of the Stray Remarks Doctrine,
particularly the second requirement that a nonstray remark must
be made in the direct context of the employment decision. 214 Fur-
thermore, Reeves indicates that a reasonable trier of fact may infer
intentional discrimination if the plaintiff establishes the prima fa-
cie case and demonstrates pretext through presentation of circum-
stantial evidence, including evidence of discriminatory remarks. 215
209. See id.
210. Id. at 151.
211. See id. at 152-53. Professor Stuart L. Bass also emphasizes this point. See Stuart L.
Bass, Reeves v. Sanderson: United States Supreme Court Attempts to Clarify Plaintiffs Burden
in 'ADEA' Claims, 105 COM. L.J. 275, 283-84 (2000).
212. 530 U.S. at 146-47 ("The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defen-
dant .. .may, together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional
discrimination." (citing St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993))).
213. See id. at 152-53.
214. See id.
215. Id. at 153-54.
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Thus, post-Reeves, it is no longer appropriate for a court to "substi-
tute its judgment concerning the weight of the evidence for the
jury's" and grant an employer's motion for summary judgment, or
motion for judgment as a matter of law, if the plaintiff has demon-
strated pretext using evidence of discriminatory remarks, even if
those remarks were not made when the adverse decision was
made.216
The Supreme Court did not clarify how connected a remark
should be to a decision in order for it to be considered evidence
critical to the plaintiffs case, rather than stray. Consequently, it
remains unclear an employer's whether remarks made several
months or several years prior to an employment decision will have
any probative value to the plaintiffs showing of pretext. But, it
seems from the Reeves opinion that in a disparate treatment case,
the probative value of any age-based, sexist, or racist remarks will
be determined by the trier of fact, irrespective of when those re-
marks were made in relation to the challenged employment deci-
sion. 2
17
Because the individual making the discriminatory remarks
in Reeves was the actual decisionmaker, 218 the Court did not ad-
dress whether the other key requirement of the Stray Remarks
Doctrine-that a nonstray remark must be made by the decision-
maker himself-should also be applied less stringently. It will con-
sequently be up to the Supreme Court, in deciding a future dispa-
rate treatment case, to clarify that point. 219
B. How the Lower Courts Have Applied the Doctrine Post-Reeves
Since the Court handed down its decision in Reeves, the
First, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have com-
mented on the current status of the Stray Remarks Doctrine in dis-
parate treatment cases. 220 Most circuit courts have continued to ap-
ply the Stray Remarks Doctrine to disparate treatment cases in
much the same way that they did prior to the Reeves decision. 221 For
216. Id. at 152-53.
217. See id.
218. See id. at 152 (finding that Reeves introduced evidence that Chestnut, who made the
discriminatory comments, "was the actual decisionmaker behind his firing," because Chestnut
was married to the owner who made the "formal decision to discharge [Reeves]").
219. This Note argues infra Part VI.C that it would be reasonable for the Supreme Court to
allow juries to evaluate evidence of remarks made by nondecisionmakers.
220. See infra notes 221-31 and accompanying text.
221. See, e.g., Cervantes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 00-1058, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 63, at
*11 (10th Cir. Jan. 3, 2001) (evidence of "racially hostile remark" presented by plaintiff "appears
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example, in Epstein v. Loyola University Medical Center, the Sev-
enth Circuit held that "stray remarks unrelated to the decision to
terminate and made by non-participants in the decision do not
serve as evidence of discriminatory intent to establish pretext."
222
The Fifth Circuit, however, reviewing another age discrimi-
nation case brought under the ADEA, 223 and evaluating the proba-
tive value of discriminatory remarks directed at the plaintiff,224 in-
sisted that "in light of the Supreme Court's admonition in Reeves,
our pre-Reeves jurisprudence regarding so-called 'stray remarks'
must be viewed cautiously." 225 The Fifth Circuit in that case, Rus-
sell v. McKinney Hospital Venture held that evidence of a decision-
maker's discriminatory remarks, coupled with the plaintiffs prima
facie case and additional evidence of age-based motive, "was suffi-
cient evidence for the jury to find that defendants discriminated
against Russell on the basis of age."
226
The Russell holding is significant for two reasons. First, the
court found that Steve Ciulla, the individual who made the age-
based remarks, was "principally responsible" for the plaintiffs ter-
mination, even though he was employed in a position that was the
same level as the plaintiffs position, and even though Ciulla did not
officially terminate the plaintiff.2 27 The Fifth Circuit based this de-
termination on the fact that Ciulla, whose father was the CEO of
the parent corporation, "wielded sufficiently great 'informal'
power... such that he effectively became the decisionmaker with
to be only a stray remark and may be of little probative value"); Hunt v. City of Markham, 219
F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2000); Williams v. Raytheon Co., 220 F.3d 16, 20 (1st Cir. 2000) ("[Gliven
the probative value" of the defendant's stated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, "these stray
remarks (or nonremarks) do not support a reasonable inference that [defendant] acted out of a
discriminatory purpose."); Epstein v. Loyola Univ. Med. Ctr., No. 99-3690, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS
22732 (7th Cir. Sept. 7, 2000); Campbell v. Coastal Mart, No. 00-1060, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS
14672, at *7 (10th Cir. June 27, 2000) (employer's comment, "poor old black woman wants to
learn," which trial court concluded was "at best a stray remark" was "insufficient to support an
inference of discriminatory motivation").
222. 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 22732, at *12.
223. See Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 221 (5th Cir. 2000).
224. Evidence presented by the plaintiff indicated that the decisionmaker repeatedly referred
to the plaintiff as "old bitch." Id. at 226. The court determined that the jury could reasonably find
that the repeated use of "old bitch" indicates that the decisionmaker had discriminatory motives.
See id.
225. Id. at 229.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 226-29. Although another employee, Ms. Jacobsen, actually fired the plaintiff, the
evidence showed that Ciulla threatened to quit if Jacobsen did not terminate Russell. Id.
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respect to Russell's termination."228 Thus, the court adopted a more
lenient view of the decisionmaker requirement and found that
Ciulla's remarks were not "stray" and could be properly presented
to the jury.
229
Second, the Russell opinion is significant because it specifies
that, in general, it is no longer acceptable to view evidence of work-
place remarks through the "harsh lens" previously utilized by the
Fifth Circuit and several other circuits. 230 Implementing this new
post-Reeves approach, the court concluded that age-based remarks
could be found by a jury to demonstrate age-based animus, even if
the remarks were "not in the direct context of the decision and even
if uttered by one other than the formal decisionmaker, provided
that the individual is in a position to influence the decision." 23 1
C. Should Any Aspects of the Doctrine Survive Reeves?
Justice O'Connor articulated the Stray Remarks Doctrine in
Price Waterhouse to identify a particular type of evidence-stray
remarks-that do not constitute direct evidence. 232 This Note ar-
gues that the Doctrine was thus meant to apply only to discrimina-
tion cases in which a plaintiff attempts to prove his or her case by
presenting direct evidence of an employer's discriminatory motive.
Justice O'Connor never indicated that workplace remarks not made
by a decisionmaker in the context of a decision cannot be presented
to a jury as circumstantial evidence. Thus, this Note insists that, at
least as it has been applied to circumstantial evidence discrimina-
tion cases, the Stray Remarks Doctrine should be significantly
modified in light of Reeves.
233
First, the doctrine should no longer refer to "stray" remarks.
In fact, the name "Stray Remarks Doctrine" should perhaps be
eliminated altogether from the legal lexicon. Unquestionably, the
title was a misnomer from its inception. 234 By characterizing re-
marks as "stray," the name concludes what it purports to assess-
228. Id. at 228. Ciulla was found to have possessed greater power than the ordinary workers
at his level due to his father's position. See id. He was also found to have taken advantage of that
power. See id.
229. See id. at 226.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 229.
232. 490 U.S. 228, 277-79 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
233. 530 U.S. 133, 151-54 (2000).
234. This idea was first suggested to the author by The Honorable Lee H. Rosenthal, United
States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, in November 2000.
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that is, the probative value (or lack thereof, i.e., the "stray-ness") of
discriminatory workplace remarks. This Note suggests that work-
place remarks in disparate treatment cases should be treated the
same as other types of circumstantial evidence are treated in any
other civil case. There is nothing so uniquely characteristic about
workplace remarks that warrants taking the determination of their
evidentiary weight away from juries. The relevance, probative
value, and potential prejudice of the evidence of remarks should be
initially assessed by the court in accordance with the Federal Rules
of Evidence.235 Upon a finding that the evidence of workplace re-
marks does have some relevance, and that its probative value is not
substantially outweighed by a risk of prejudice to the defendant,
the evidence should be submitted to and weighed by the factfinder.
Accordingly, a jury should consider evidence that can shed light on
an employer's motives, unless the court determines that the poten-
tial prejudice of the evidence substantially outweighs its value. It
should be up to the jury, as the factfinder, to weigh all of the evi-
dence and decide whether workplace remarks were "too vague, too
distant, or counterbalanced by other evidence to support a claim of
discrimination. "236
This conclusion is supported by the Court's decision in
Reeves 237 and is further substantiated by the fact that Justice
O'Connor, the creator of the Stray Remarks Doctrine, also authored
the majority opinion in Reeves.238 The Reeves decision insisted that
simply because an offensive racist, sexist, or age-based remark is
not made directly in the context of an employment decision, this
fact should not eviscerate the remark's probative value. 239 Such re-
marks, particularly when viewed in the aggregate, should not be
categorically excluded from jury consideration. Instead, a jury
should be entitled to consider such remarks when determining
whether an employer has given a false reason for an employment
decision and whether the proffered reason was intended to mask
the true discriminatory motive. Presented with evidence that a su-
pervisor expressed discriminatory views in the past, a jury could
235. See FED. R. EViD. 401-403.
236. Reply Brief of Petitioner at *18, Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S.
133 (2000) (No. 99-536).
237. 530 U.S. at 151-54.
238. See id. at 137.
239. See id. at 152-53. Courts have substantiated this conclusion. For example, the Fifth Cir-
cuit declared in Evans v. City of Bishop: "Reeves emphatically states that requiring evidence of
discriminatory animus to be 'in the direct context' of the employment decision is incorrect." 238
F.3d 586, 591 (5th Cir. 2000).
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reasonably infer that the supervisor still adhered to those views,
even if the employer did not express them at the time he or she
made the employment decision. 240 Given the high evidentiary bur-
den placed on the plaintiff in disparate treatment cases based upon
indirect evidence, 241 allowing the jury to consider evidence of such
formerly "stray" remarks in deciding whether an employer had a
discriminatory motive for making the employment decision would
not unfairly prejudice the defendant.
Second, if it is reasonable for the trier of fact to assess the
weight that should be given to evidence of discriminatory remarks
not made in the direct context of the decisionmaking process, it
should also be reasonable for the trier of fact to evaluate the proba-
tive value of remarks not made by decisionmakers themselves.
Armed with clear and thorough jury instructions, juries are capable
of assessing the level of influence the speaker may have had over
the decisionmaking process. Likewise, juries have the capability to
decide, based upon the totality of the evidence, whether discrimina-
tory remarks made by nondecisionmaking supervisors and employ-
ees are illustrative of a hostile and biased work environment that
necessarily tainted the adverse decision, or whether those remarks
did not influence the decision in any way. After all, "the very es-
sence of the [jury's] function is to select from among conflicting in-
ferences" in order to decide "that which it considers most reason-
able. "242
Persistent age-based, sexist, or racist remarks may contrib-
ute to a workplace climate where discrimination appears to be the
norm. 243 A decisionmaker in that climate will be influenced to make
employment decisions in accordance with that norm. Such discrimi-
natory statements, when made by other employees or supervisors,
or by the decisionmaker himself, are not "stray" at all. At a mini-
mum, the remarks tend to show an employer's acceptance of or ac-
quiescence to such discriminatory attitudes in the workplace, and
240. This idea was similarly espoused by Reeves in his Reply Brief to the Supreme Court.
Reply Brief of Petitioner at * 17, Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000)
(No. 99-536).
241. Justice Souter, in his dissent in Hicks, characterized the evidentiary burden formulated
by the majority as a rule adopted "for the benefit of employers who have been found to have
given false evidence in a court of law," whom the court favors "[by] exempting them from respon-
sibility for lies." St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 537 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting).
242. See Anderson v. Bessermer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574-75 (1985); Tennant v. Peoria Pac.
Union Ry., 321 U.S. 29, 35 (1944).
243. See Lawton, supra note 55, at 641.
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more likely, they demonstrate that an employer was more likely
than not to have acted from an unlawful motive. 244
Certainly, a trier of fact presented with evidence of such dis-
criminatory workplace attitudes and behavior may conclude that
discrimination did not motivate the adverse decision against the
plaintiff. But, the key point is that it is up to the trier of fact to de-
cide that factual issue based upon the evidence. It is improper for
the court, rather than the trier of fact, to conclude that evidence of
workplace attitudes in the form of remarks is stray in nature and
irrelevant to the plaintiffs case. As Professor Deborah Malamud
has asserted, " 'Stray remarks' of a discriminatory nature may
mean very little when the plaintiffs case is otherwise extremely
weak. But if the plaintiffs case appears to have some merit in other
respects, or if the remarks corroborate other evidence of... tension
in the workplace, it would be inappropriate categorically to ignore
the remarks." 245
This Note acknowledges the justifications for the Stray Re-
marks Doctrine and the insistence on the part of employers that
they not be held liable for the discriminatory attitudes of their em-
ployees who played no role in the decisionmaking process. 246 Unde-
niably, it is crucial that a finding of disparate treatment liability
under Title VII or the ADEA be firmly based upon a plaintiffs clear
showing that an illegal motivation on the part of the employer
prompted the challenged employment decision.247 Yet, this Note
also argues that the determination of whether the plaintiff has
made that clear showing is a factual question that should be an-
swered by the trier of fact. Modifying the Stray Remarks Doctrine
as proposed herein does not automatically lead to unwarranted li-
ability for employers. Rather, the modification simply assigns the
task of weighing the circumstantial evidence, including evidence in
the form of workplace remarks, to the appropriate party-the trier
of fact.
244. See Smith v. Leggett Wire Co., 220 F.3d 752, 765 (6th Cir. 2000) (Martin, C.J., dissent-
ing) ("Evidence of racist remarks or isolated incidences of racial conduct directed toward ...
employees .. .may be critical for the jury's assessment of whether a given employer was more
likely than not to have acted from [a discriminatory] motive ... 1; tlhe jury was entitled to factor
such remarks into their decision.").
245. Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L.
REV. 2229, 2324 (1995) (arguing that evidence of discrimination should get its meaning and
strength from the context in which it arises).
246. See supra Part V.B.




From McDonnell Douglas to Reeves, the Supreme Court has
evaluated disparate treatment cases in an attempt to limit confu-
sion among circuit courts and clarify the evidentiary burdens that
should be placed on plaintiffs and defendants when plaintiffs at-
tempt to prove their cases using circumstantial evidence. Addition-
ally, the Court in Reeves clarified another facet of discrimination
law that prompted much confusion and dissention among circuits-
the lower courts' interpretation and application of the Stray Re-
marks Doctrine to circumstantial evidence disparate treatment
cases. 248 Holding that evidence of remarks made in the workplace,
but not necessarily made in the direct context of an employment
decision, may be assessed by the factfinder, the Court directed cir-
cuit courts to rethink their pre-Reeves jurisprudence regarding the
Stray Remarks Doctrine.
249
Tracing the progression of the Court's analytical framework
in circumstantial evidence disparate treatment cases, one can see
that the Court in Reeves has ultimately moved toward treating dis-
parate treatment cases less like exceptional legal situations that
demand uniquely higher evidentiary burdens to be put on parties,
and more like any other type of civil case. 250 It follows, then, that
evidence presented in those disparate treatment cases should be
governed by the same evidentiary rules and standards that regulate
other civil cases. Thus, a court presiding over a disparate treatment
case, in which the plaintiff is attempting to prove her case by pre-
senting a combination of pieces of circumstantial evidence, should
follow the Federal Rules of Evidence and assess all evidence for
relevance, probative value, prejudice, etc. Accordingly, the trier of
fact should determine the weight and credibility of the evidence of
workplace remarks formerly branded as "stray," notwithstanding
the fact that the remarks may have been uttered by a nonofficial
decisionmaker, or not made in the direct context of the decision-
making process.
This conclusion necessarily precludes application of the
Stray Remarks Doctrine to disparate treatment cases in which
plaintiffs utilize circumstantial, not direct, evidence of discrimina-
248. Id.
249. See supra Parts V.B-C.
250. 530 U.S. at 148-49.
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tory motive. Such a preclusion has the benefit of both unifying and
simplifying the approach taken by circuit courts regarding the as-
sistance that evidence of workplace remarks can lend plaintiffs in
proving their cases of intentional discrimination.
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